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A NEW DIMENSION IN THE RATABLE TAKING
OF NATURAL GAS IN OKLAHOMA:
ENROLLED HOUSE BILL 1221
I. INTRODUCTION
In May of 1983 Governor George Nigh signed into law a bill
which adds a new dimension to the production and sale of natural gas
in Oklahoma. Enrolled House Bill 1221' introduces fundamental
changes in the rights and duties of mineral owners, producers, opera-
tors and purchasers with regard to the ratable taking of natural gas.
Due to the magnitude of these changes, challenges to the legislation's
validity are likely. This Comment will examine House Bill 1221 (here-
inafter H.B. 1221 or the Act) in light of the challenges that may be
raised and will assess the likelihood of their success.
II. THE NEED FOR RATABLE TAKING OF NATURAL GAS
The concept of real property ownership at common law was em-
bodied in the maxim cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum et ad infer-
nos which means "whose is the land, his is also that which is above and
below it."2 Under this concept, which is commonly known as the ad
coelum doctrine, a landowner owned not only the surface of his land
but everything above and below it as well. Thus, one who held title to
a parcel of land also held title to any minerals lying beneath the land
While this doctrine served the needs of the judiciary in dealing with
minerals having a fixed situs (e.g., coal), it was inadequate for dealing
with migratory minerals such as oil and natural gas.4 Because of their
migratory characteristics, oil and gas could be drained from under one
parcel of land by a well drilled on an adjacent parcel.5 Who would be
considered the owner of the oil and gas at any given time? Would it be
the landowner from under whose property the oil and gas was drained
1. 1983 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 77 (codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, §§ 541-47 (Supp. 1983)).
2. Brandes v. Mitterling, 67 Ariz. 349, -, 196 P.2d 464, 467 (1948); see also Edwards v.
Lee's Adm'r, 265 Ky. 418, -, 96 S.W.2d 1028, 1029 (1936), -; Edwards v. Sims, 232 Ky. 791,-,
24 S.W.2d 619, 620 (1929); Toth v. Bigelow, 1 N.J. 379, -, 64 A.2d 62, 64 (1949).
3. See, e.g., Toth, 64 A.2d at 64.
4. See 1 W. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 4 (1954) (general discussion of the
physical attributes of oil and gas in the reservoir).
5. Id
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or the adjacent landowner whose labor and capital investment actually
brought the minerals to the surface where they could be put to benefi-
cial use?
A workable solution to this dilemma was eventually devised by
analogizing to the law surrounding animalsferae nalurae.6 A property
owner acquired no property rights in wild animals on his property un-
less and until he actually reduced them to possession by capturing
them.7 Similarly, a property owner acquired no property rights in min-
eralsferae naturae underlying his property until he reduced them to his
possession.' The intuitive appeal of the analogy and its application are
illustrated by the following excerpt:
[O]il, and still more strongly gas, may be classed by themselves, if the
analogy be not too fanciful, as mineralsferae naturae. In common
with animals, and unlike other minerals, they have the power and the
tendency to escape without the volition of the owner .... They
belong to the owner of land, and are part of it, so long as they are on
or in it, and are subject to his control; but when they escape, and go
into another's control, the title of the former owner is gone. Posses-
sion of the land, therefore, is not necessarily possession of the gas. If
an adjoining, or even a distant, owner drills his own land, and taps
your gas, so that it comes into his well and under his control, it is no
longer yours but his. And equally so as between lessor and lessee
. . . , the one who controls the gas-has it in his grasp, so to speak-
is the one who has possession in the legal as well as in the ordinary
sense of the word.9
Thus, under the rule of capture a landowner acquired title to oil and gas
produced from wells on his land even if part of the oil had migrated
from adjacent tracts."l The rule of capture has been widely adopted
6. "Of a wild nature or disposition. Animals which are by nature wild are so designated, by
way of distinction from such as are naturally tame, the latter being called domitae naturae."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 747 (5th ed. 1979).
7. See, e.g., Fleet v. Hegeman, 14 Wend. 42, 46 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837) (oysters planted in a
bed by an individual not animalsferae naturae).
8. Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. De Witt, 180 Pa. 235, -, 18 A. 724, 725
(1889).
9. Id
10. I d; Brown v. Spilman, 155 U.S. 665, 669-70 (1894); Hammonds v. Central Ky. Natural
Gas Co., 255 Ky. 685,-, 75 S.W.2d 204, 205 (1934); Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n,
286 U.S. 210,233 (1931);seealso 1 E. KUNTZ, LAW OF OIL AND GAS §§ 4.1-4.2 (1962) (hereinafter
cited as KUNTZ); I H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 204.4 (1983) (hereinafter
cited as WILLIAMS & MEYERS); Pierce, Coordinated Reservoir Development-An Alternative to the
Rule of Capture for the Ownership and Development of Oil and Gas-Part 1, 4 J. ENERGY L. &
POL'Y 1, 27-33 (1983) (hereinafter cited as Pierce, Coordinated Reservoir Development). There are
three ownership theories currently being utilized in the United States, of which the rule of capture
is an integral part. However, the rule of capture operates essentially the same regardless of the
applicable ownership theory. Under the non-ownership theory, oil and gas in place is owned by no
[Vol. 20:77
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and remains the law today in many jurisdictions," including
Oklahoma.'
Unfortunately, the rule of capture also had unforeseen and unde-
sirable consequences. While the rule had the desirable effect of encour-
aging development of oil and gas reserves, it did so at the expense of
economic and physical waste.' 3 Since one overlying landowner could
legally reduce an entire reservoir to his possession, the only viable rem-
edy available to adjacent landowners was to drill wells of their own
and attempt to "capture" as much oil and gas as possible."' As a result,
many more wells were drilled than necessary to efficiently develop pro-
ducing formations.15 The cost of these unnecessary wells resulted in
higher production costs which were ultimately passed on to consumers
in the form of higher prices.' 6 In addition to excessive drilling costs,
the rush to produce often resulted in supplies of oil and gas far in ex-
cess of market demand.' 7 This surplus caused prices to fall so that
those who invested in the oil and gas fields, as well as royalty owners,
actually got fewer dollars and less oil and gas than if the fields had
been scientifically developed.' 8 Since excess natural gas could not be
stored it was often simply vented into the atmosphere, rapidly exhaust-
ing underground reservoir energy.' 9 For example, in the Glenn Pool
oil field alone it was estimated that 50,000,000,000 cubic feet of natural
one. Only when the minerals are reduced to possession does ownership attach. The ownership in
place theory treats oil and gas as a part of the land itself and vests ownership with the landowner
while the minerals are on or under the land, or otherwise subject to the landowner's control.
Finally, the qualied ownership theory vests title to oil and gas in the landowner while remaining
in or on his land. However, his ownership is subject to divestment should the minerals migrate to
another tract of land. Oklahoma has apparently adopted the qualified ownership theory. Rich v.
Doneghey, 71 Okla. 204,206-7, 177 P.86, 89-90 (1918); see also I WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note
10, at §§ 203.1-203.4 for an explanation of the various ownership theories.
11. See, e.g., Succession of Rugg, 339 So. 2d 519, cert. denied, 341 So. 2d 897 (La. App. 1976);
Wronski v. Sun Oil Co., 89 Mich. App. 11, 279 N.W.2d 564 (1979); Masonite Corp. v. State Oil &
Gas Bd., 240 So.2d 446 (Miss. 1970); Baumgartner v. Gulf Oil Corp., 184 Neb. 384, 168 N.W.2d
510 (1969); Halbouty v. Railroad Comm'n, 163 Tex. 417, 357 S.W.2d 364, cert. denied, 371 U.S.
888 (1962).
12. Frost v. Ponca City, 541 P.2d 1321 (Okla. 1975).
13. See, e.g., Hague v. Wheeler, 157 Pa. 324, 27 A. 714 (1893); see also 1 WILLIAMS & MEY-
ERS, supra note 10, at § 204.6; Pierce, CoordinatedReservoir Development, supra note 10 at 4, 56.
14. Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 216 Pa. 362, -, 65 A. 801, 802 (1907).
15. J. CLARK, THE OIL CENTURY 97-99 (1958).
16. Id
17. Id
18. Id; see also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF MINERAL LAW, CONSERVATION
OF OIL & GAS, A LEGAL HISTORY, 1948, 7-15 (1949) (general discussion of reservoir energies and
the engineering basis for conservation).
19. CLARK, supra note 15, at 149.
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gas were wasted by 1912.20 While excess oil could be stored, produc-
tion often exceeded available storage facilities.2 Producers with no
market or storage facilities were forced to store their production in gul-
lies, creeks, and earthern reservoirs until demand increased or until
storage tanks could be built.22 Evaporation, seepage and run-off took a
heavy toll.23
Various attempts have been made to mitigate the undesirable ef-
fects of the rule of capture. One such attempt is the judicially created
doctrine of correlative rights.24 This doctrine essentially provides that
in the process of reducing oil or gas to his possession, an overlying
landowner may not violate the correlative rights of other overlying
landowners.2" One commentator has identified these correlative rights
as:
1) "the right against waste of extracted substances,"
2) the right "against spoilage of the common source of supply" (i.e.,
the reservoir),
3) the right "against malicious depletion of the common source of
supply, and"
4) "the right to a fair opportunity to extract oil or gas."26
A landowner who either purposefully or negligently violates one of
these correlative rights may be liable in damages to other landowners
in the common source of supply. 27
In addition to judicial efforts to tame the rule of capture, many
state legislatures have enacted conservation measures intended to pro-
tect correlative rights and to maximize recovery of available resource
deposits.2" At a minimum, such legislation expressly defines and pro-
hibits waste of natural resources. 29 However, many states go further
20. Id
21. Id at 153.
22. Id at 153-54.
23. Id at 155-56.
24. See, e.g., Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 209-11 (1900); Manufacturers' Gas & Oil
Co. v. Indiana Natural Gas & Oil Co., 155 Ind. 461, 57 N.E. 912, 915 (1900); see general , I
Kuntz, supra note 10, at §§ 4.3-4.7; Pierce, Coordinated Reservoir Development, supra note 10, at
50-55.
25. See, e.g., Manufacturer's Gas & Oil Co., 57 N.E. 912 at 915; Louisville Gas Co. v. Ken-
tucky Heating Co., 132 Ky. 435, -, III S.W. 374, 376 (1908); Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky
Heating Co., 117 Ky. 71, -, 77 S.W. 368, 369-70 (1903).
26. 1 KUNTZ, supra note 10, at § 4.3.
27. Louisville Gas Co., 111 S.W. at 376.
28. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-102, 55-103, 55-108, 55-121, 55-601, 55-602, 55-603, 55-610,
55-612, 55-701, 55-702, 55-703, 55-703a (1983).
29. E.g., CAL. PUB. Rns. CODE §§ 3300, 3500, 3501 (West 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-108,
55-121, 55-601, 55-602, 55-701, 55-702 (1983); OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, §§ 86.2, 86.3, 236, 237, 238, 271,
[Vol. 20:77
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and attempt to conserve available resources by regulating use,30 pro-
duction 3' and sale.2 One such regulatory measure, the one with which
this Comment is concerned, requires the ratable taking of natural gas
by producers and purchasers from a common source of supply.33 Such
regulations typically require production from the common source of
supply to be in accordance with some prescribed formula or alloca-
tion34 and require purchasers to take from such producers without dis-
crimination as to price or amount." Ratable taking restrictions prevent
one producer from fulfilling his sales contracts at the expense of other
producers in the field.
III. RATABLE TAKING OF GAS IN OKLAHOMA PRIOR TO H.B. 1221
As one of the pioneers in conservation legislation, Oklahoma has
enacted several provisions dealing directly or indirectly with the ratable
taking of natural gas,36 many of which remain in force today.37  Ini-
tially, while in its natural state, the natural gas belongs to the overlying
273 (1981); TEx. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. §§ 85.045, 85.046, 86.011, 86.012, 86.082, 86.083, 91.015
(Vernon 1978).
30. Eg., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-102, 55-103, 55-108 (1983); OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, §§ 293, 295,
302 (1981); TEx. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 86.011, 86.181-86.185, 87.131, 87.132, 87.171, 87.172,
91.017, 91.018 (Vernon 1978).
31. E.g., CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 3301, 3450, 3451, 3630, 3640, 3645 & 3652 (West 1972);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-603, 55-703, 55-703a, 55-1301 to 55-1315 (1983); OKLA. STAT. tit. 52,
§§ 87.1, 232, 239, 272, 274 & 287.1-287.15 (1981); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 85.053-85.055,
86.011, 86.081-86.097 & 87.051-87.054 (Vernon 1978).
32. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-610, 55-612, 55-1401 to 55-1423 (1983); OKLA. STAT. tit. 52,
§§ 23, 54, 240 & 272 (1981); TEx. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. §§ 85.041, 85.048 & 87.133 (Vernon
1978).
33. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, §§ 23, 232, 233, 239 & 240 (1981); see generally 5 KUNTz,
supra note 10, at § 75.3. "[R]atable taking is defined as the proportion which the natural flow of
gas from the wells of one producer bears to the amount of the natural flow from the wells of the
other owners producing from the same common source of supply or common reservoir." Repub-
lic Natural Gas Co. v. State, 198 Okla. 350, 354-55, 180 P.2d 1009, 1013-14 (1947) (construing
OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, §§ 232, 233 (1947)).
34. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 232 (1981) which provides:
Any owner or oil and gas lessee of the surface, having the right to drill for gas shall have
the right to sink a well to the natural gas underneath the same and to take gas therefrom
until the gas under such surface is exhausted; in case other parties having the right to
drill into the common reservoir of gas drill a well or wells into the same, then the amount
of gas each owner may take therefrom shall be proportionate to the natural flow of his
well or wells to the natural flow of the well or wells of such other owners of the same
common source of supply of gas, such natural flow to be determined by any standard
measurement at the beginning of each calendar month; provided that not more than fifty
percent (50%) of the natural flow of any well shall be taken unless, for good cause shown
and upon notice and hearing, the Corporation Commission may, by proper order, permit
the taking of a greater amount.
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landowner or lessee. 8 Once production begins, however, the rule of
capture prevails subject to certain limitations.3 9 Natural gas may not
be produced in a manner constituting waste40 as defined in two differ-
ent provisions. In 1915 the term included the "escape of natural gas in
commercial quantities into open air, the intentional drowning with
water of a gas stratum capable of producing gas in commercial quanti-
ties, underground waste, the permitting of any natural gas well to
wastefully bum and the wasteful utilization of such gas."'" In 1947 the
definition was expanded to include "the production of gas in such
quantities or in such manner as unreasonably to reduce reservoir pres-
sure or unreasonably to diminish the quantity of oil or gas that might
be recovered from a common source of supply" as well as "the unnec-
essary depletion or inefficient utilization of gas energy contained within
a common source of supply. '42 Wasteful production is further limited
in Oklahoma by the Oklahoma Corporation Commission's power to
promulgate rules and regulations. 43
In addition to prohibitions against wasteful production practices,
producers in Oklahoma face restrictions on the volume of gas which
they can legally produce. A producer may take only an "amount of gas
• . . proportionate to the natural flow of his well or wells to the natural
flow of the well or wells of. . . other owners of the same common
source of supply of gas."'  Furthermore, when the amount of gas
available from a common source of supply exceeds the market demand
for such gas, producers may only take "such proportion of the natural
gas that may be marketed without waste, as the natural flow of the well
or wells owned or controlled by any such person, firm or corporation
bears to the total natural flow of such common source of supply. '4 5
38. Id § 231.
39. The law of capture remains viable in Oklahoma within certain limits as illustrated by the
following comment from the Oklahoma Supreme Court:
[U]nder the "law of capture" which obtains in Oklahoma, a landowner does not own
migratory substances underlying his land, but has an exclusive right to drill for, produce,
or otherwise gain possession of such substances, subject only to restrictions and regula-
tions pursuant to police power. [Citations omitted]. A landowner does not acquire title,
or absolute ownership of the migratory substances, until the substances are reduced to
actual possession by being brought to the surface and then controlled. [Citations
omitted].
Frost v. Ponca City, 541 P.2d 1321, 1323 (Okla. 1975).
40. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 236 (1981).
41. Id § 237.
42. Id § 86.3.
43. Id
44. Id § 232.
45. Id § 239.
[Vol. 20:77
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Any producer taking more than his proportionate share will be subject
to civil46 and criminal47 sanctions.
Purchasers of Oklahoma natural gas also face numerous conserva-
tion regulations. Any party taking gas from a gas field must, with cer-
tain narrow exceptions, take ratably from each owner in proportion to
that owner's interest in the field and at a price agreed upon by the par-
ties.48 If the parties are unable to agree on a price, one will be fixed by
the Oklahoma Corporation Commission.49 Pipelines operating within
the state are deemed to be common carriers and are therefore unable to
discriminate in the transportation of natural gas.5" In addition, such
pipelines and any other parties purchasing gas within the state are
deemed to be common purchasers. 51 As such, they are required to
purchase all natural gas within reach of their pipeline without discrimi-
nation as to the producer of the gas. 5z However, if the common pur-
chaser is unable to purchase all gas offered for sale, it must take ratably
from each producer and may not discriminate as to price or amount.53
IV. GENERAL PROVISIONS OF H.B. 1221
H.B. 1221 was signed into law on May 3, 1983, and became effec-
tive immediately due to its emergency status.54 Its stated purpose is "to
protect the rights and correlative rights of all interest owners of natural
gas wells. . . and to afford all such owners an equal opportunity to
extract their fair share of gas and to sell and be paid in proportion to
46. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 234 (1981) provides:
Any person, firm or corporation, taking more than his or its proportionate share of...
gas, in violation of the provisions of this act, [footnote omitted] shall be liable to any
adjoining well owner for all damages sustained thereby and subject to a penalty for each
violation not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500.00), and each day such violation is
continued shall be a separate offense.
47. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 235 (1981) provides:
Any person or agent of a corporation, who takes gas, or aids or abets in the taking of gas,
except as herein provided, either directly or indirectly, as an individual, officer, agent, or
employee of any corporation, shall be guilty of grand larceny, and, upon conviction
thereof, shall be sentenced to the penitentiary not to exceed five (5) years.
48. Id § 233.
49. Id
50. Id § 24. Pipelines may not transport the natural gas of one producer and refuse to trans-
port that of another producer.
51. Id §§ 23, 240.
52. Id
53. But see, e.g., Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Corporation Comm'n of Kan., 372 U.S. 84, 94,
reh'g denied 372 U.S. 960 (1963) (state conservation measures aimed at interstate purchasers, as
opposed to producers, were preempted by the federal Natural Gas Act).
54. See supra note I.
1984]
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their interest therein."" Furthermore, the Act is intended "to protect
such owners against discrimination in purchases in favor of one owner
against another. '5 6
Section Two of the Act57 is probably the most controversial provi-
sion. This section provides that when a well is placed into production,
each owner is entitled to share ratably in the revenues generated by the
sale of production. 8 This provision goes a step beyond existing ratable
take statutes which only require that each owner be allowed to extract
his fair share of gas from the well59 and suggests the creation of some
type of cotenancy property interest in the proceeds generated by a
well's production. This suggestion is supported by other provisions
within the Act as discussed below. Of course the exact nature of the
property interest created will depend largely upon judicial interpreta-
tion of the Act and regulations promulgated thereunder.
Prior to the date of the first production, the operator of the unit
area must offer each owner in the well an election whereby the operator
will seek to market that owner's ratable share of production or any
designated portion thereof.6" If the owner so elects, the operator must
attempt to market the owner's share at the best price and terms avail-
able in the area but not at a price and terms less favorable than those
received by the operator.6 The electing owner is not bound to accept
any offer procured by the operator but the owner's failure to reject an
offer within 30 days is deemed to be an acceptance thereof.6" If no offer
is forthcoming within 120 days from the date of election the owner may
rescind the election in writing. 3 The election is not mandatory but is
merely an option available to the owner, and if the option is not exer-
cised, the operator is under no duty to market the owner's share."4 The
owner retains the right to separately dispose of his share of production
or to receive it in kind whether or not the election is made,65 although if
the election is made and an offer accepted this right will likely cease.
If an electing owner receives a contract for sale of only his portion
55. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 541 (Supp. 1983).
56. Id
57. Id § 542.
58. Id § 542(A).
59. Id §§ 232, 233 (1981).




64. Id § 542(C).
65. Id § 542(D).
[Vol. 20:77
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of production, Section Three provides that the other electing owners
not under contract are entitled, but not compelled, to share ratably in
the revenue from the contract "to the extent of their net revenue inter-
est."66 The electing owner receiving the sales contract must give writ-
ten notice to all other net revenue owners without contracts so that they
may decide whether or not to deliver their share of production for
sale.67 The quoted language further implies that under H.B. 1221, not
only do mineral owners in a well have ownership rights in the gas pro-
duced from the well, but also in the revenue generated from the sale of
that gas.
Section Four of the Act68 provides that a well's lawful daily pro-
duction is owned by all owners in proportion to their interest in the
well regardless of which owner actually produces the gas.69 An owner
producing and selling gas separately from other owners must account
to those owners and compensate them for their proportionate share of
the gas.7" Section Five requires that distribution of revenues from the
sale of production be made pursuant to title 52, section 540 of the
Oklahoma Statutes and that an owner receiving revenues directly from
a purchaser must forward the same to the party responsible for distri-
bution under section 540.71
Section Six operates as a disclaimer of sorts by specifying exactly
what H.B. 1221 is not intended to do. It is not to be construed as 1) set-
ting or restricting the price, terms or conditions for the sale of produc-
tion; 2) requiring a purchaser to connect to a well he is not already
obligated to connect to; or 3) altering the legal definitions of common
purchaser or common carrier.7 2
Under Section Seven, the Oklahoma Corporation Commission is
empowered to promulgate rules and regulations for implementing H.B.
1221 and enforcement of penalties for violating its provisions. 73 How-
ever, owners are not precluded from suing one another in state district
courts and the courts may administer existing legal remedies including
the award of treble damages and attorneys' fees.74
66. Id § 543(A).
67. Id § 543(B).
68. Id § 544.
69. Id
70. Id
71. Id § 545.
72. Id § 546.
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Finally, Section Eight provides that the provisions of the Act are
severable so that a judicial determination that any part is void does not
affect the other parts.75
V. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF H.B. 1221
As with most ratable take statutes enacted in Oklahoma, the valid-
ity of H.B. 1221 will undoubtedly be challenged.76 The following sec-
tions examine the validity of the Act in light of the challenges which
are likely to be raised.
A. Federal Preemption
One potential challenge is that state authority to regulate or affect
an interstate pipeline's purchase of natural gas has been preempted by
the Natural Gas Act of 1938 (NGA)77 and the Natural Gas Policy Act
of 1978 (NGPA)78 and is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Fed-
eral Energy Regulatory Commission (hereinafter FERC), successor to
the Federal Power Commission (hereinafter FPC).79 The complexity
of these two federal acts and their interrelationship with one another
precludes a simple resolution of the challenge. Furthermore, the fact
that the NGPA does not completely abrogate the NGA but, rather,
modifies and supplements it necessitates an examination of both acts.
1. Natural Gas Act
The jurisdiction of the FPC under the NGA extends to "[1] the
transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, [2] to the sale in
interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public con-
sumption for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any other use, and
[3] to natural-gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale."80
However, the FPC has no authority over "[1] any other transportation
or sale of natural gas or [2]. . . the local distribution of natural gas or
[3]. . . the facilities used for such distribution or [4]. . . production or
75. Id § 541 (1983 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 77, § 8 provides for severability as noted after § 541).
76. See, e.g., Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950)
(Oklahoma Corporation Commission order directing pipeline operator to connect its pipeline to a
gas well and to take gas from that well ratably with other wells in the gas field upheld against due
process, equal protection and federal preemption challenges).
77. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1982).
78. Id §§ 3301-3432.
79. See, ag., Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 349 U.S. 44 (1955) (per
curiam).
80. 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1982).
[Vol. 20:77
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gathering of natural gas.""1 At first glance it would appear that H.B.
122 1's regulation only of producers and operators would place it within
the "production or gathering" exception to the FPC's jurisdiction.
However, in Phillps Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin,82 the Supreme Court
extended the jurisdiction of the FPC to mere producers. The Court
held that an independent natural gas producer which sold gas to an
interstate pipeline for interstate transportation and resale was a natural
gas company within the meaning of the NGA and that the sale, there-
fore, was not exempted from FPC jurisdiction by the "production or
gathering exception."8 3 The Court looked to the legislative history of
the NGA and found "a congressional intent to give the. . .[FPC]...
jurisdiction over the rates of all wholesales of natural gas in interstate
commerce, whether by a pipeline company or not and whether occur-
ring before, during, or after transmission by an interstate pipeline com-
pany." 4 This language represented a significant expansion of the
scope of the FPC's jurisdiction beyond what had been previously
believed.
Two subsequent per curiam opinions overturned an attempt by the
Oklahoma Corporation Commission to fix a minimum price for the
sale of gas to an interstate pipeline." Citing Phillips as controlling, the
Court held that "such a sale and transportation cannot be regulated by
a State but are subject to the exclusive regulation of the Federal Power
Commission. ' 86 While both Phillips and the later per curiam opinions
deal specifically with state economic regulation of wholesales to inter-
state pipelines, the language used, particularly in the latter opinions,
can be read to preempt any state regulation of such wholesales, pre-
sumably including conservation measures. Such a reading would sug-
gest that H.B. 1221 is indeed federally preempted, at least insofar as it
regulates producer sales to interstate pipelines.
In Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Corporation Commission of Kan-
sas,87 the Supreme Court expressly extended FPC jurisdiction to state
ratable take orders affecting sales to interstate pipelines. The Court
81. Id
82. 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
83. Id at 677.
84. Id at 682. For an excellent discussion of Philis, its impact and the subsequent expan-
sion of FPC jurisdiction see 1 AMERICAN GAS ASSOCIATION, REGULATION OF THE GAS INDUS-
TRY §§ 20.01-20.04 (1983).
85. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Panoma Corp., 349 U.S. 44 (1955) (per curiam) (decided
together with Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Corp. Comm'n, 349 U.S. 44 (1955).
86. Id (emphasis added).
87. 372 U.S. 84, reh'g denied 372 U.S. 960 (1963).
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indicated that "[tlhe federal regulatory scheme leaves no room either
for direct state regulation of the prices of interstate wholesales of natu-
ral gas, [citations omitted], or for state regulations which would indi-
recto' achieve the same result.""8 The ratable take orders were found to
constitute invalid state price regulation, which directly affected "the
ability of the Federal Power Commission to regulate comprehensively
and effectively the transportation and sale of natural gas, and to
achieve the uniformity of regulation, which was an objective of the
Natural Gas Act." 9 However, Northern Natural Gas cannot be read as
invalidating all state conservation measures affecting interstate whole-
sales of natural gas. The Court expressly recognized "a significant dis-
tinction, . . . between conservation measures aimed directly at
interstate purchasers and wholesalers for resale, and those aimed at
producers and production. The former cannot be sustained when they
threaten. . . the achievement of the comprehensive scheme of federal
regulation."90 Therefore, the implication of Phillops and Northern Nat-
ural Gas is that state conservation measures aimed directly at produ-
cers and production will be sustained unless they threaten the
uniformity of federal regulation by indirectly affecting the prices of in-
terstate wholesales of natural gas.
When viewed in this context the validity of H.B. 1221 is questiona-
ble. While the Act is not aimed directly at interstate purchasers and
does not directly regulate the prices of interstate wholesales, it affects
such purchasers and purchases indirectly. For example, assume that
each owner in a well has elected to have the operator of the unit area
market his share of production under Section Two of H.B. 1221.91 The
operator is under a duty to market such production "at the best price
and terms available in the area. . . [but]. . . in no event upon a price
and terms less than that received by the operator."92 Thus, the state
effectively creates a minimum price below which the production cannot
be sold-the price and terms received by the operator. If the potential
customers of the operator are interstate pipelines, there is arguably an
indirect state regulation of wholesale gas prices as prohibited by Phil-
14s 93 and Northern Natural Gas.94 While Section Six of the Act pro-
88. Id at 91 (emphasis added).
89. Id at 91-92.
90. Id at 94.
91. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 542(B) (Supp. 1983).
92. Id
93. 347 U.S. at 672.
94. 372 U.S. at 84.
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vides that it is not to be construed as fixing a price for sales of natural
gas, 95 such a construction would be strained under the foregoing facts.
If each owner in a given well elects to have its share of production
marketed by the operator, and if the express language of Section
Two96 is given effect (i.e., operator prohibited from selling at a lower
price than he receives), Section Six would clearly be violated since the
price received by the operator for his own share of production is the
effective minimum price below which the remainder of the well's pro-
duction cannot be sold.
The conflict between the two sections could be avoided by constru-
ing Section Two97 as requiring only that the operator make a "best
effort" or a "reasonable effort" to market the production of electing
owners at a price no less than that which he receives. While such a
construction would likely alleviate the apparent conflict between Sec-
tion Two 9s and Section Six99 of the Act, as well as avoiding preemption
problems with the NGA, it would also serve to render H.B. 1221 inef-
fective. It is doubtful whether purchasers would be willing to purchase
the owner's share of production at the same price paid to the operator if
such production could be purchased for less after the operator had
made a reasonable attempt to market the production at a higher price.
Therefore, on the basis of the provisions of the NGA and interpre-
tive judicial decisions, it can be argued that H.B. 1221 represents a po-
tential state invasion of the FPC's exclusive jurisdiction under the
NGA. While the potential invasion may be avoided in part by judicial
construction, such a construction might render the Act ineffective.
2. Natural Gas Policy Act
Section 3431 of the NGPA' ° sets forth its coordination with the
NGA. In general, FERC jurisdiction under the NGPA no longer ex-
tends to "first sales" of gas "not committed or dedicated to interstate
commerce as of November 8, 1978."''1 1 Also excluded from FERC ju-
risdiction are "first sales" or gas "committed or dedicated to interstate
commerce as of November 8, 1978," which is "high cost natural gas,"
95. Okla. Stat. tit. 52, § 546 (Supp. 1983).
96. Id. § 542 (B).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id § 546.
100. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1982).
101. Id § 3431(a)(1)(A).
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"new natural gas" or "natural gas produced from any new, onshore
production well."'10 2  All other sales and transportation previously
within the jurisdiction of the FPC remain under FERC jurisdiction.103
A first sale is defined as any sale to 1) an interstate pipeline, 2) an
intrastate pipeline, 3) a local distribution company, 4) a party for their
own use or 5) any sale prior to such a sale.1°4 However, a sale by an
interstate pipeline, an intrastate pipeline or a local distribution com-
pany does not qualify as a first sale unless the gas sold was also pro-
duced by the selling party "or any affiliate thereof."'10 5 Thus, it can be
inferred from the foregoing that a sale by an interstate pipeline, an in-
trastate pipeline, a local distribution company, or any affiliate thereof,
of gas not produced by such party to any other party would not consti-
tute a first sale and would remain within the jurisdiction of the FERC.
One of the problems raised by the provisions of H.B. 1221 is the
status of the unit area operator in the scheme of the NGPA while en-
gaged in marketing the production of electing owners. For example,
assume that the unit area operator is a large integrated petroleum com-
pany which owns mineral interests in the gas field and also owns and
operates the interstate pipeline which carries gas from the field to inter-
state markets. Sales by the company, or an affiliate thereof, of gas
which it produced would be a first sale under the NGPA and, therefore,
exempt from FERC jurisdiction.106 However, if we assume further that
all of the owners within a unit area elect to have the operator market
their shares of production under Section Two'017 of H.B. 1221, a poten-
tial problem arises.
It appears from the provisions of the NGPA that such sales do not
constitute first sales since they are sales by an interstate pipeline, intra-
state pipeline, or local distribution company, or an affiliate thereof of
gas not produced by such party.'08 If the sales are not first sales, they
would remain subject to FERC jurisdiction since they are not expressly
removed therefrom.' 9 However, such sales are also subject to indirect
state price regulation under Section Two" 0 of H.B. 1221 as discussed
102. Id § 343 1(a)(1)(B)(i), (ii) & (iii).
103. Id
104. Id § 3301(21)(A)(i), (ii), (iii) & (iv).
105. Id § 3301(21)(B).
106. Id
107. Okla. Stat. tit. 52, § 542(B) (Supp. 1983).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 3301(21)(B) (1982).
109. Id § 3431(a)(1).
110. Okla. Stat. tit. 52, § 542(B) (Supp. 1983).
[Vol. 20:77
14
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 20 [1984], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol20/iss1/4
ATABLE TAKING
above in connection with the NGA (i.e., the operator cannot sell elect-
ing owner's production at a price less than he receives).
Thus, H.B. 1221 constitutes a potential invasion of FERC's exclu-
sive jurisdiction and would be void, at least insofar as presented by the
facts above. The ultimate determination of the validity of H.B. 1221
will depend upon judicial interpretation of both the NGPA and H.B.
1221. However, it appears from the foregoing analysis that there are
sufficient potential conflicts between the two acts to warrant close scru-
tiny by Oklahoma courts.
B. Commerce Clause
Another issue closely related to federal preemption is whether
H.B. 1221 constitutes a state infringement upon the exclusive power of
Congress to regulate interstate commerce under the commerce clause
of the Constitution."' Clearly, the Act does not discriminate against
interstate commerce on its face, thereby avoiding the strict scrutiny
standard of review applied by the Supreme Court in such cases."12
Rather, H.B. 1221 merely affects interstate commerce by its applicabil-
ity to all sales of natural gas by Oklahoma producers, including those
sales to interstate pipelines which are destined for out of state
markets.' 13
As such, H.B. 1221 need only meet the general requirements set
forth by the Supreme Court in Pike v. Bruce Church."I4 Pike essen-
tially sets forth a two-step commerce clause analysis. The initial in-
quiry is whether the state legislation or regulation promotes a
"legitimate local public interest." '5 If not, the legislation will be struck
down as a violation of the commerce clause. However, if the legislation
promotes a legitimate local interest, the second step of the analysis re-
quires that the local interest be balanced against the burden imposed
on interstate commerce." 6 If the effects of the state legislation "on in-
terstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the bur-
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 & 2 provides that "The Congress shall have Power. . .To
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes. .. "
112. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 323 (1979).
113. Although H.B. 1221 does not expressly provide that it applies to sales to interstate pipe-
lines, neither does it expressly exclude such sales. Thus, an inference can be made that the Act
applies to all sales of natural gas by Oklahoma producers, at least until there is contrary judicial
determination.
114. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
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den imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits.""I7 Thus, it appears that state legislation which
excessively burdens interstate commerce to the detriment of legitimate
local interests will be struck down.
In applying the foregoing analysis to H.B. 1221, it may be argued
that conservation of natural resources is a legitimate local interest. In
upholding a state's constitutional right to impose ratable taking by reg-
ulating the purchase of natural gas, 1 8 the Supreme Court in Cities
Services Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co. I19 found a clear legitimate
local interest in the conservation of natural gas. The Court explained
that "[a] state is justifiably concerned with preventing rapid and uneco-
nomic dissipation of one of its chief natural resources." ' Thus, H.B.
1221 clearly satisfies the first prong of the Pike commerce clause
analysis.
The second prong of the analysis requires that Oklahoma's interest
in conserving natural gas be weighed against the impact of H.B. 1221
on interstate commerce. As discussed above in the context of federal
preemption, Section Two of the Act 2 ' effectively sets a minimum price
(i.e., the price received by the unit area operator) below which the pro-
duction of electing owners may not be sold. This minimum price ap-
parently applies to all sales, including those to interstate markets.
Thus, H.B. 1221 may potentially impact interstate commerce, although
the extent of such impact will depend upon judicial interpretation of
Section Two of the Act and the facts of the particular case.
The Supreme Court in Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. 122
stated that "a State's power to regulate commerce is never greater than
in matters traditionally of local concern."' 2 3 Conservation of natural
resources has been determined to be such a matter of traditional local
concern.' 4 Thus, there are factors to be considered on either end of
117. Id
118. The Court in Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Corporation Comm'n of Kansas, 372 U.S. 84
(1963), distinguished Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950) and
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Oklahoma, 340 U.S. 190 (1950) on the following basis: "In those cases
we were dealing with constitutional questions and not the construction of the Natural Gas Act."
372 U.S. at 91 n.10. The implication is that a state may have a constitutional right to regulate
conservation of state resources; however, that right may be preempted by federal legislation.
119. 340 U.S. 179 (1950).
120. Id at 187.
121. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 542(B) (Supp. 1983).
122. 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
123. Id at 670.
124. Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179, 187 (1950).
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the commerce clause balance-the potential impact of H.B. 1221 on
interstate commerce vs. Oklahoma's interest in conserving natural gas.
While it is impossible to accurately predict how the courts will strike
the balance between these competing interests, it can safely be said that
H.B. 1221 represents a potential state infringement on Congress' exclu-
sive power to regulate interstate commerce.
C. Contract Clause
H.B. 1221 will likely be challenged as an impairment of existing
natural gas sales contracts in violation of the contract clause of the
Constitution. 25 The leading case in this area is Energy Reserves Group,
Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co. ,t26 wherein the Supreme Court set
forth a three-part analysis for determining whether a state law impairs
existing contracts. 27 The initial inquiry is "whether the state law has,
in fact, operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual relation-
ship."' 28 If there is in fact substantial impairment, "the State, in justifi-
cation, must have a significant and legitimate public purpose behind
the regulation, such as the remedying of a broad and social or eco-
nomic problem."' 29 If both of these requirements are met, the regula-
tion will be upheld so long as "the adjustment of 'the rights and
responsibilities of contracting parties [is based] upon reasonable condi-
tions and [is] of a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying
[the legislation's] adoption.' "1 0
It is doubtful whether H.B. 1221 constitutes a substantial impair-
ment of natural gas sales contracts in light of the Court's application of
the above mentioned test to the facts in Energy Reserves.' 3 ' The issue
in Energy Reserves was whether a state statute, regulating the price of
natural gas, impaired the plaintiffs sales contract with the defend-
ant. 132 The Court held that it did not, finding it "[s]ignificant. . . that
the parties . . . [were] . . . operating in a heavily regulated indus-
125. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 provides that "No State shall. . . pass any. . . Law im-
pairing the Obligation of Contracts.
126. 459 U.S. 400 (1983).
127. Id at 410-13 (citing United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) and Allied
Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978)).
128. 459 U.S. at 411 (emphasis added).
129. Id at 411-12.
130. Id
131. See supra note 126; see also Note, Legislative Impairment of Natural Gas Contracts: En-
ergy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 19 TULSA L.J. 384 (1984) for an analysis of
the Energy Reserves decision.
132. 459 U.S. 400 at 410.
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try."' 33 The Court found that "[plrice regulation existed [in the natural
gas industry at the time the contracts were entered into] and it was
foreseeable as the type of law that would alter contract obligations" so
that the seller's "reasonable expectations" were not impaired by the
Kansas regulation. 34
If this rationale is applied in cases questioning the validity of H.B.
1221, it can be argued that the Act affects parties operating in the same
"heavily regulated industry."135 Furthermore, ratable take statutes ap-
plying to both producers 36 and purchasers 137 were in effect in
Oklahoma at the time many existing natural gas contracts were entered
into. It was foreseeable that such regulation would continue to exist,
and perhaps even increase, in the future. Thus, it is doubtful that H.B.
1221 impairs the "reasonable expectations" of parties to existing natu-
ral gas sales contracts, with the possible exception of contracts signed
prior to enactment of ratable take statutes.
Even if H.B 1221 was found to substantially impair existing sales
contracts, the state should have no difficulty in justifying the Act as
having a "significant and legitimate public purpose."' 138 As discussed
above in connection with the commerce clause analysis, the Supreme
Court has recognized conservation of natural resources as a substantial
local interest. 139 Furthermore, there is nothing in the language of H.B.
1221 which appears to be unreasonable or inappropriate to that local
purpose. Therefore, it is unlikely that H.B. 1221 will be struck down as
violative of the contract clause.
D. Due Process and Equal Protection
Current Oklahoma ratable take statutes have been attacked as a
taking of private property without due process of the law, as well as a
denial of equal protection in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.' 40 The same challenges may also be made to H.B. 1221. The
success of such challenges, however, appears unlikely in light of the
almost complete deference given state legislatures by the Supreme
133. Id at 413.
134. Id at 416.
135. Id at 413.
136. Eg., OKLA. STAr. tit. 52, §§ 232, 239 (1981).
137. Id §§ 23, 233, 240.
138. Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 411.
139. Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179, 187 (1950).
140. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Oklahoma, 340 U.S. 190 (1950).
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Court in Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co. 141 The Court
characterized Cities' due process and equal protection challenges to
Oklahoma's then existing ratable take provisions 42 as "virtually with-
out substance."' 143 Stating that it is "undeniable that a state may adopt
reasonable regulations to prevent economic and physical waste of natu-
ral gas,"' 44 the Court required only that such regulations be "substan-
tially related to a legitimate end sought to be attained." 145 In applying
this standard, the Court looked only to the evidence before the Corpo-
ration Commission at the time the contested order was issued and, find-
ing the evidence sufficient, upheld the order.146 The Court refused to
examine the propriety of the order and stated that "[ilt is no concern of
ours that other regulatory devices might be more appropriate, or that
less extensive means might suffice. Such matters are the province of the
legislature and the commission."'' 47
Thus, to withstand due process and equal protection challenges,
H.B. 1221 need only be found reasonable and "substantially related to
a legitimate end."' 141 It would not be enough for one challenging the
legislation to show that "some other regulatory device might be more
appropriate" 149 or that "less extensive means might suffice." '15 Rather,
it would have to be shown that H.B. 1221 was unreasonable or that it
was not substantially related to legitimate ends.' 5' Clearly, the ends
sought to be achieved by H.B. 1221 are legitimate. They are the same
ends sought by the ratable take statutes challenged and upheld in Peer-
less, namely conservation of natural gas and protection of correlative
rights.15 2 It would be difficult to argue that the means employed by
H.B. 1221 are not substantially related to these ends since compliance
with the Act would almost certainly result in the accomplishment of the
desired goal. Finally, the reasonableness of H.B. 1221 is largely a ques-
tion of fact and, as such, difficult to predict. It is clear that the party
141. 340 U.S. 179 (1950).
142. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, §§ 23-25, 231-233, 239, 240 (1941).
143. 340 U.S. at 185.
144. Id.
145. Id at 186 (citing Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934)).
146. Peerless, 340 U.S. at 186.
147. Id
148. Id at 185.
149. Id. at 186.
150. Id
151. Id at 185, 186.
152. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 541 (Supp. 1983).
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challenging the reasonableness of H.B. 1221 based on due process and
equal protection arguments bears a heavy burden of proof.
VI. CONCLUSION
As shown in the foregoing analysis, H.B. 1221 is a valid exercise of
Oklahoma's police power only if it is construed so as to avoid potential
infringements on federal regulatory power. However, several caveats
to this conclusion are in order. First, the Court does not always follow
its own precedent.15 3 Occasionally the Court will take a new direction
in a certain matter due to the emergence of new public policies, person-
nel changes within the Court, etc.' 54 Such a shift in direction is by no
means inconceivable should the Court examine H.B. 1221.
Secondly, much of the analysis within this Comment is, of neces-
sity, largely subjective due to the nebulous nature of the legal principles
involved. For example, how intrusive must a statutory provision be
before it substantially impairs an existing contract? When does a stat-
ute's effect on interstate commerce become more than merely inciden-
tal? Reasonable men may differ in their answers to such questions.
Thirdly, it must be remembered that, even if H.B. 1221 alone does
not violate the Constitution, individual regulations promulgated by the
Corporation Commission under authority of the Act may do so. Hav-
ing not been promulgated at the time of this writing, a discussion of
such regulations would be inappropriate.
Finally, it is always risky to predict the future. Legislation which
appears innocuous on paper will occasionally have unforeseen conse-
quences in the context of real life. This is particularly true when deal-
ing with an industry as complex and pervasive as the natural gas
industry. Nevertheless, it is hoped that despite these caveats, this Com-
ment has highlighted some of the changes brought about by H.B. 1221
and exposed some of the surrounding uncertainties.
Rick D. Chamberlain
153. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (the Court aban-
doned the "separate but equal" doctrine announced in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
154. See, e.g., Brown, 347 U.S. at 492.
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